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Rhetoric and pedagogy 
Malcolm Heath 
Abstract: This article traces the development of rhetorical pedagogy from Homer to 
late antiquity. It is clear from Homer that effective public speaking was valued in 
archaic Greece, and seen as a teachable skill. Formalised and theorised rhetorical 
pedagogy was developed gradually by the sophists of the fifth and early fourth 
centuries BC, but the evidence for their work is very limited. Isocrates and the author 
of the Rhetoric to Alexander build on earlier sophistic rhetoric in different ways. 
Evidence becomes most abundant in late antiquity, from the second century AD 
onwards. Innovations in rhetorical theory and concurrent changes in the structure of 
pedagogical practice in this period reflect the perennial responsiveness of rhetoric as a 
practical discipline to its socio-cultural context. 
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:HXVHODQJXDJHWRLQIOXHQFHRWKHUSHRSOH¶VEHOLHIVDWWLWXGHVDQGGHFLVLRQV²in 
short, to persuade. Since some people are more consistently successful in this than 
others, and experience is one of the factors that contribute to success, it is clear that 
skill in the persuasive use of language can in some measure be learned. Can it also be 
taught? The assumption that it can is present in the very earliest stages of the Greek 
literary tradition. In the Iliad$FKLOOHV¶IDWKHUPeleus assigns his son a tutor, Phoenix, 
WDVNHGµWR WHDFK\RXDOO WKHVH WKLQJV WRPDNH\RXDVSHDNHURI words and a doer of 
GHHGV¶Il. 9.440-3). Achilles later acknowledges his failure to master one half of the 
FXUULFXOXPµ,DPDQZLWKRXWHTXDO«LQZDUWKRXJKWKHUHDUHRWKHUVEHWWHUVNLOOHGDW
GHEDWH¶ I $FKLOOHV¶ self-assessment is realistic: his mishandling of the 
assembly in Iliad 1 has had catastrophic consequences. The fact that he had been 
tutored makes his failure less excusable than tKDW RI 2G\VVHXV¶ VRQ 7HOHPDFKXV a 
young man who has grown up without paternal oversight in a community in which 
normal political life has been in abeyance (his mother remarks on his inexperience: 
Od. 4.818). When he convenes an assembly to challenge the position of a powerful 
clique, it is not surprising that the outcome is a humiliating failure (Heitman 2005, 14-
28).  
These two cases illustrate situations in which success or failure in persuasion have 
significant public consequences, and in which the teachability of effective speech 
carries the greatest premium. Greeks accordingly came to associate rhetoric 
paradigmatically with the use of language to persuade in certain kinds of public 
dispute. Deliberative disputes may be directly concerned with the welfare of a whole 
community, though the outcome will also affect the disputants¶ public standing. 
Individual status, property or life are directly at stake in judicial disputes. There are, 
however, also contexts requiring skilled public speech in which it would be a faux pas 
to treat a proposition as open to dispute. If you are welcoming a visiting dignitary, for 
example, it would be inappropriate to argue that he is an important person whose 
presence is an honour and a delight; you must take that for granted and exhibit the 
(putatively) acknowledged fact. No deliberative or judicial decision is demanded of 
the audience, but your words will, if successful, make certain facts more salient to 
those already inclined to accept them. Even here, then, language is used to influence 
attitudes.  
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The classification of speeches into deliberative, judicial and ceremonial 
(epideictic) kinds constructed in the previous paragraph is so familiar that it may seem 
self-evident. As we shall see, however, other ways of conceptualising the domain of 
rhetoric remained current at least to the end of the fourth century BC. This provides a 
simple reminder of two essential features of the Greek rhetorical tradition. First, it 
was in constant evolution: according canonical status to any particular theorisation or 
theorist (Aristotle, for example, or Cicero or Quintilian) inevitably falsifies the 
historical reality. Secondly, rhetorical pedagogy and its evolution were inseparably 
connected with the evolution of theoretical codifications of rhetoric (Heath 2009a). It 
is characteristic of the Greek rhetorical tradition that teachers enhanced their 
pedagogy by providing their pupils with a guiding framework based on explicit 
categorisations and principles abstracted from the untidy complexities of successful 
practice $ULVWRWOH¶V Rhetoric begins by recognising that rhetoric, like reasoning, is 
something with which everyone has some acquaintance; the function of art (WHNKQƝ) is 
to transform spontaneous or habitual persuasion into a methodical practice by 
determining the factors that explain success (Rhet. 1.1, 1354a1-11). Speaking of arts 
in general, he distinguishes experts who can give an explanation of successful practice 
from skilled practitioners whose ability to achieve success is based on experience and 
is relatively inarticulate. The former have more prestige and are better able to teach 
(Met. 1.1, 980b25-b10). But Aristotle does not deny that practical success, which 
depends on judgement of individual cases, may owe more to experience than to 
theoretical generalisation (981a12-24). Though the rejection of theory was an 
eccentric minority view (e.g. Quintilian 2.11f., with Heath 2009a, 71f.), Greek 
rhetoricians never questioned, and usually emphasised, the importance of tacit 
procedural insight to successful persuasion.  
How early did the theoretical tendenF\EHFRPHHVWDEOLVKHG",Q3ODWR¶VPhaedrus, 
Socrates refers to the handbooks on rhetoric that Nestor and Odysseus wrote in their 
spare time during the Trojan War (261b-c). Phaedrus sees a reference to more recent 
figures behind this playful anachronism. In reality, Homeric education would not have 
dealt in theoretical abstractions. The closest we come to seeing Phoenix acting as 
teacher is in Iliad 9, where he is a member of the delegation sent to persuade Achilles 
to rejoin the fighting. Advising Achilles KRZ WR EHKDYH LQ D FULVLV OLPLWV 3KRHQL[¶V
options: there is, for example, no opportunity to expose Achilles to live models, to 
demonstrate techniques, or to rehearse his pupil and give feedback. But he can tell 
stories that provide Achilles with models to emulate or avoid, and he can offer 
situation-specific instructions, supported by general injunctions. Such seemingly 
universal imperatives always presuppose an assessment of the specific situation. So 
Phoenix also GUDZVKLVSXSLO¶VDWWHQWLRQWR circumstances that make the recommended 
assessment appropriate to the situation. One function of theory in later times will be to 
help students bridge the gap between universal precepts and particular situations.  
When we turn to the sophists of the late fifth and early fourth centuries BC, we 
are on only slightly firmer ground. The diversity of the intellectual interests of the 
sophistic movement (Kerferd 1981; Ford 2001) makes it unrealistic to suppose that 
rhetoric was a primary concern of every sophist²though even contemporaries could 
make the misleading generalisation that sophists in general were experts in making 
SHRSOHµclever DWVSHDNLQJ¶3O. Prot. 312d). But Gorgias certainly undertook to make 
people clever at speaking about the most important human affairs²that is, capable of 
persuading by speech in courts and deliberative bodies (Pl. Gorg. 448e-9e, 451d, 
452d-e, 454b; Meno 95c). According to Aristotle, Gorgias¶ teaching consisted in 
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supplying his pupils with speeches to be learned by heart. This, he complains, 
provided the pupils with products of the art of rhetoric but not with the art itself. 
Aristotle scornfully compares this technique to teaching someone to avoid sore feet by 
providing them with lots of different shoes: a need has been met, but no expertise has 
been imparted (SE 34, 183b36-4a8). 7H[WV VXFK DV *RUJLDV¶ Helen and Defence of 
Palamedes are likely to have been written as such exemplars (Cole 1991a, 71-94); the 
uncomfortable density of their stylistic and argumentative devices suggests that they 
were designed as concentrated repositories of techniques, to be quarried rather than 
faithfully reproduced. 7KH H[DPSOH RI 3ODWR¶V Phaedrus, who has borrowed and 
memorised a speech by Lysias (Phdr. 228d-e), provides further attestation for this 
pattern of teaching. 
*RUJLDV LV PHQWLRQHG LQ 3ODWR¶V Phaedrus as asserting the superiority of 
probabilities (eikota) to truth, and the capacity of rhetoric to make small things seem 
large and vice versa (267a). Since such claims (relevant to advertising the power of 
persuasive speech, as in the Helen) would be more convincingly supported by 
demonstration than by theory 3ODWR¶V HYLGHQFH LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK $ULVWRWOH¶V
FKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRI*RUJLDV¶WHDching methods. Plato here pairs Gorgias with an earlier 
rhetorician, Tisias. This shadowy figure must be approached with extreme caution 
(Cole 1991b). According to some later sources, Tisias and his teacher Corax founded 
the art of rhetoric and in doing so anticipated theoretical doctrines not otherwise 
attested until a much later date. 7KLV µHYLGHQFH¶ LV thoroughly unreliable: it is 
compromised by the persistent tendency of doxographic traditions to fill evidential 
voids by conjecture (a tendency which still flourishes in the modern literature on 
sophistic rhetoric). The earliest stratum of surviving evidence is a safer guide. There 
are two references to Tisias in Phaedrus, both associating him with arguments from 
probability (267a, 273a-e), GHILQHG DV µZKDt most people think¶ D). Aristotle 
mentions Tisias as one of the earliest contributors to the development of rhetoric (SE 
34, 183b302), and reports that arguments from probability were the sole content of the 
art of Corax (Rhet. 2.24, 1402a18). Corax (µ&URZ¶) is likely to be a nickname, and it 
has been plausibly suggested that Tisias and Corax are in fact one person (Cole 
1991b, 80-83). Plato provides evidence that a written text by Tisias was available for 
Phaedrus to study (Phdr. 273a), but all that we can infer about that text is that it was 
about arguments from probability and included examples.  
We return to the more secure ground of extant texts with Antiphon¶V Tetralogies, 
sets of speeches (dating perhaps to the latter part of the fifth century) illustrating how 
to argue each side of three imaginary homicide cases. These are demonstration texts 
with an interesting difference (Innes 1991). Each of the three cases requires a different 
defence: denying the homicide, maintaining that it was accidental, and claiming 
justification. The complete set therefore provides, not only an illustrative repository of 
technical means of persuasion, but also a systematic overview of different kinds of 
dispute that may arise from a legal charge, and the way each party should approach 
them. This is the aspect of rhetoric that would, in later times, be elaborately theorised 
in successive versions of the theory of issue (stasis). The Tetralogies themselves do 
no more than illustrate: they convey no explicit theory. But it is hard to imagine that 
someone capable of constructing this package of examples would be unable to 
supplement the texts with at least a minimal articulation of their underlying 
framework µLI WKH GHIHQGDQW GLVSXWHV WKH DOOHJHG IDFWV WKHQ WKLV LV KRZ WKH case 
should EHDUJXHG¶ 
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Another kind of demonstration text took the form, not of a complete speech, but 
of a collection of variants on a single part of a speech. An extant example of this 
genre is the collection of proems attributed to Demosthenes, but others are known to 
have existed. Antiphon is credited with collections of proems and epilogues (Suda 
ǹǿ325); the Art of Rhetoric attributed to him (Suda M1310) is likely to have 
comprised these collections of examples rather than explicit theoretical exposition. 
Thrasymachus, one of the rhetoricians mentioned in Phaedrus, is credited with 
another collection of proems (Athenaeus 10, 416a); a lengthy quotation in Dionysius 
of Halicarnassus (Dem. 3) is probably one of these model proems (Yunis 1997). In 
another collection, Thrasymachus demonstrated ways of appealing for pity (Ar. Rhet. 
3.1, 1404a14-15). In this case, the examples illustrate, not one part of a speech, but 
one persuasive technique. 7LVLDV¶ ZRUN RQ DUJXPHQWV IURP SUREDELOLW\ is likely to 
have been of this kind.  
Although such collections teach by providing examples, they are also evidence of 
some movement in a theoretical direction. The fact that certain parts of a speech and 
certain persuasive techniques have been isolated and explicitly identified presupposes 
a conception, however rudimentary, of the normative structure of a speech and of its 
YDULRXVIXQFWLRQV3ODWR¶VPhaedrus again provides corroboration. The context of the 
second reference to Gorgias is a brief catalogue of the kinds of thing that can be 
learned IURP µWKH ERRNV ZULWWHQ RQ WKH DUW RI VSHHFKHV¶ (266d-7d). This catalogue 
shows unmistakeable signs of the emergent analytical and theoretical tendencies in 
rhetoric. Its frame adumbrates what would later become a standard account of the 
structure of a speech (proem, narrative, supporting arguments, and recapitulation), 
though the analysis is not yet fully explicit and the terminology remains unstable. 
Arguments are classified as witness statements, inferential arguments from evidence 
(tekmƝria), and arguments from probability (eikota). Socrates also mentions more 
refined distinctions among techniques (confirmation and supplementary confirmation; 
refutation and supplementary refutation; covert allusion and oblique praise) and a 
variety of contributions concerned with diction and style, as well as 7KUDV\PDFKXV¶
techniques for invective and for achieving emotional effects (arousing and assuaging 
anger or pity, for example). Though teachers may still have been working primarily 
through demonstration, the proliferation of terminological refinements at which 
Socrates pokes gentle fun makes it certain that analytical frameworks were under 
development. A teaching practice based on demonstrations accompanied by 
explanatory comment is not the same as one based on theoretical precepts illustrated 
by examples, but the boundary is easily crossed.  
The frustrating fact remains that the available evidence does not provide a secure 
basis for more than the vaguest conjectures about how early sophistic rhetorical 
pedagogy would have worked in practice. Isocrates raises hopes of more substantial 
insights. His writings contain passages reflecting on his own pedagogical practice, 
and contrasting it with that of RWKHU WHDFKHUV RI µSROLWLFDO VSHHFKHV (logoi)¶ 7Kis 
contrast reminds us that we cannot assume uniformity in teaching practice: Isocrates 
may be an unrepresentative figure from whom we cannot generalise. On the other 
hand, we should not take ,VRFUDWHV¶ ZRUG on trust: when he speaks of rivals in the 
context of self-promoting polemic, he has an incentive to exaggerate differences. 
There may, then, be an element of caricature when he criticises WHDFKHUVRIµSROLWLFDO
speeches¶for failing to recognise the importance of experience and natural talent: they 
treat speaking as if it were the same as spelling²that is, as if it were governed by a 
set of fixed rules that could be applied across all situations. Isocrates insists that 
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creativity is an essential component of the art of public speech, since no speaker gains 
by saying just what has been said already: the key is to say something that others have 
not thought of, while still speaking appropriately to the subject. Speech needs to fit 
the specific occasion (kairos), to be appropriate, and to be innovative (Against the 
Sophists 9-13). For this reason, Isocrates affirms the necessity of talent and 
experience. Indeed, they are sometimes sufficient: many have become effective 
speakers and politicians without formal training (14). Training can enhance such 
SHRSOH¶VVNLOODQGUHVRXUFHIXOQHVVWKHVXFFHVVWKH\DFKLHYHunsystematically becomes 
more directly accessible (15). The parallel with $ULVWRWOH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRI rhetoric as 
the transformation of spontaneous or habitual persuasion into a methodical practice is 
clear. 
$VNHWFKRI,VRFUDWHV¶RZQmodel of rhetorical training follows (16f.). One part is 
to learn the ideai of speech, the basic forms from which all speeches are constructed 
(we shall shortly return to the possible meaning of ideai and its variant HLGƝ). This is 
comparatively easy, given genuinely expert tuition; what is harder is selecting the 
ideai for any given subject, combining and arranging them. This must be done in a 
way that fits the specific occasion, and the whole speech must be appropriately 
elaborated in thought and expression 7KH VWXGHQW¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ LV intensive study, 
which is IUXLWOHVVZLWKRXWDµcourageous and imaginative VRXO¶KHPXVWOHDUQWKHHLGƝ 
of speech and practice their uses (NKUƝVHLV7KH WHDFKHU¶VFRQWULEXWLRQ LV WRJLYHDQ
accurate and comprehensive exposition of these basics and, for the more advanced 
aspects, to present himself as an exemplar (paradeigma) on which students can 
pattern themselves by imitation. Imitation here clearly does not mean merely 
UHSHDWLQJRUDGDSWLQJWKHWHDFKHU¶VGHPRQVWUDWLRQVLWLVQRWWKHVXUIDFHRIWKHWH[Wthat 
the student must emulate but the underlying, and necessarily creative, art. The pattern 
that emerges is a two-stage programme: the student first assimilates the exposition of 
EDVLF WKHRU\ DQG WKHQ PRGHOV KLV SUDFWLFH RQ WKH PDVWHU¶V GHPRQVWUDWLRQV (cf. 
Antidosis 183). We might expect the master to provide some feedback on the 
VWXGHQW¶V HIIRUWV, but there is no positive evidence of this and we should not 
necessarily assume it: we know of later teachers who disdained to give feedback (Sen. 
Contr. 9.2.23).  
Isocrates mentions the ideai or HLGƝ of speech without elucidation. The so-called 
Rhetoric to Alexander may help. This is the earliest surviving technical handbook, 
written in the decades 340-300 BC ,W ZDV WUDQVPLWWHG XQGHU $ULVWRWOH¶V QDPH, 
together with the fake dedicatory preface that gave it its traditional title; its real author 
is uncertain, but Anaximenes of Lampsacus is a plausible conjecture. The dominance 
of Aristotelian and later conceptions of rhetoric has been an obstacle to understanding 
this text. Indeed, this was already the case in later antiquity: readers who took the 
familiar trichotomy of kinds of speech²deliberative, judicial, ceremonial²for 
JUDQWHG ZHUH SHUSOH[HG E\ WKLV WUHDWLVH¶V GLIIHUHQW FODVVLILFDWLRQ (the opening 
sentence, which asserts the trichotomy, is probably a later addition, an attempt to tame 
the unfamiliar). In fact, the author works with VHYHQ µVSHFLHV¶ HLGƝ), the capacities 
and uses (NKUƝVHLV) of which he undertakes to enumerate. These species are not kinds 
of speech, but kinds of thing that can be done in speeches (exhortation, dissuasion, 
praise, blame, attack, defence and investigation), and they are distributed in various 
combinations across three contexts of speech: courts, public addresses and private 
discussions (homiliai). After he has completed a piecemeal discussion of these HLGƝ 
(1-28), the author turns in the second part of the treatise to how they should be 
arranged in the body of a complete speech (28-7KHSDUDOOHOWR,VRFUDWHV¶UHIHUHQFH
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to HLGƝ and to their uses (NKUƝVHLV), combinations and arrangement, is 
unmistakeable²though IsRFUDWHV¶vague and expansive use of ideai in other contexts 
makes it hard to pin down the significance of the parallel. The Rhetoric to Alexander 
is certainly not reproducing Isocratean theory, but both appear to be drawing on a 
shared, pre-Aristotelian, rhetorical tradition.  
In one respect, the Rhetoric to Alexander is likely to be more representative of 
that tradition than Isocrates 7KH LQFOXVLRQ RI SULYDWH GLVFXVVLRQV ZLWKLQ UKHWRULF¶V
domain may seem surprising, but it is consistent with other evidence for sophistic 
theory (Pl. Phdr. 261a, Soph. 222c; Alcidamas Soph. 9). Even Gorgias, whose 
SURPRWLRQDO HPSKDVLV RQ µthe most LPSRUWDQW KXPDQ DIIDLUV¶ WKDW LV MXGLFLDO DQG
deliberative debates) has already been noted, is represented as illustrating the power 
of his rhetorical art from his experience with persuasion in private contexts (Pl. Gorg. 
456a-E 7KLV LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK 3URWDJRUDV¶ FODLP WR WHDFK KRZ WR GHOLEHUDWH ZHOO
(euboulia) in household as well as civic matters (Pl. Prot. 318e-9a; cf. Meno 91a-b, 
Rep. 10, 600c-d; Xen. Mem. 1.2.64). Isocrates, too, is concerned with euboulia: 
rhetorical speech is the outward expression of good deliberation, since the proofs we 
use to persuade others and those by which we ourselves are convinced in our own 
reflections are the same (Antidosis 255-7 = Nicocles 7-9). But Isocrates almost 
completely effaces the private dimension: he says only that rhetorical training may, as 
a side-effect, improve performance in private homiliai for those who choose not to 
enter public life (Antidosis 204, cf. 99, 285). Isocrates also departs from the earlier 
sophistic tradition in disparaging judicial oratory in order to concentrate on public 
affairs. This narrowing of focus has a moral dimension. *RUJLDV¶ FODLP WR PDNH
people clever speakers was accompanied by ridicule of the claims of some other 
sophists to teach virtue (Pl. Meno 95c; cf. Gorg. 456d-7c for the moral neutrality of 
*RUJLDV¶UKHWRULFDOWHDFKLQJIsocrates, too, dismisses claims to be able to educate in 
virtue. But he argues, even so, that learning to speak well and persuasively will 
nevertheless produce moral improvement (Antidosis 274f.), primarily on the grounds 
that persuasiveness depends on having internalised the values of those one aims to 
persuade (276-80). (Plato would agree, of course, but deplores the values that the 
politician must internalise to be persuasive in existing societies.) This position would 
have been harder to maintain if judicial oratory had not been excluded: the sometimes 
dishonest tactics recommended in the Rhetoric to Alexander indicate a more purely 
instrumental, less morally engaged, conception of rhetorical education (the tactical 
dishonesties of law-court oratory are a persistent worry in ancient discussions of 
rhetoric: e.g. Quint. 2.17.26-9; 4.5.5; 12.1.33-45: Heath 2009b, 151-3).  
The link between rhetoric and euboulia makes sense, since any argument you can 
use to defend a position in public is²unless you know it to be flawed²also a reason 
for holding that position yourself; and any argument you know to be flawed is a 
potential liability in defending that position publicly. The persuasive force of tactical 
manipulations is limited, even in judicial contexts: only the use of substantively good 
arguments can guard against the risk of canny audiences seeing through, and 
intelligent opponents pointing out, the merely specious. In the Hellenistic and Roman 
periods, when cases were heard by elite magistrates who had themselves been trained 
in rhetoric and knew the tactical tricks, the premium on substantively good argument 
would be even greater. An effective regime of rhetorical training must therefore 
include procedures for identifying the objectively strong resources for arguing a given 
FDVHRQERWKVLGHVVLQFHHDFKSDUW\¶VVWUHQJWKVDUHZHDNQHVVHVRQWKHRWKHUVLGHDQG
vice versa).  
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At this point we should pause to consider what range of skills skilful practitioners 
of persuasive speech need. Obviously, one must be able to speak fluently and 
coherently. But speaking presupposes that you have something to say: the first and 
fundamental requirement is thus the ability to find what, in any given situation, is 
worth saying (heuresis, inventio). Once you have found it, you must be able to put 
your material into coherent and intelligible order (taxis, dispositio) and express it well 
(lexis or phrasis, elocutio). But these preparations will be wasted if, when the time 
comes, you cannot remember what you intended to say (PQƝPƝ, memoria), or cannot 
present it effectively in performance (hupokrisis, actio). That catalogue of skills 
reconstructs another important element of ancient rhetorical theory²the five parts of 
oratory: invention, disposition, expression, memory, and delivery. But this, too, was 
not a timeless canon: the theory developed gradually in the Hellenistic period, after 
Aristotle and before Cicero, and by the end of the second century AD it had broken 
down, in part for pedagogical reasons. Fundamental to the discovery of good 
arguments is the ability to identify a relevant and effective way of handling the 
particular kind of question in dispute: a disputed question of fact, for example, 
requires different treatment from a dispute about the justification of an admitted fact 
(the point implicit in Antiphon¶VTetralogies). But it makes little sense to treat under 
the single heading of invention both the mapping out of a global argumentative 
strategy and the detailed implementation of that strategy, which must vary between 
the parts of a speech according to their different functions. This problem, which 
defeated the authors of Hellenistic and Roman handbooks, was eventually solved by 
separating out the preliminary analysis unGHU WKH KHDGLQJ RI µLQWHOOHFWLRQ¶ QRƝVLV). 
The scope of invention was then narrowed to the parts of a speech, but at the same 
time expanded to embrace questions of style and tactical organisation that arise within 
the different parts.  
This change in rhetorical theory implies a corresponding change in teaching 
practice, for which we have relative plentiful evidence. The innovations of the second 
and early third centuries AD established a new framework which later rhetoricians 
modified and elaborated, but never dismantled (Heath 2004, 3-89). These innovations 
therefore mark a watershed in the availability of evidence. The innovations rendered 
earlier texts obsolete, and in an essentially practical discipline like rhetoric, the 
obsolete is likely to be discarded. Consequently, very little rhetorical literature 
survives from before the second century AD (the exceptions are largely works which 
enjoyed the protection of a famous name), but from the second century onwards the 
literature is abundant. Moreover, much of that literature is closely connected to 
pedagogical practice: handbooks which expound the content of rhetorical teaching; 
texts composed for, or even in, the class-room (lectures might be written up by 
teachers, or written down by students or stenographers); demonstration texts; and 
diverse texts which explicitly or allusively comment on or describe elements of 
classroom practice. Though many gaps and uncertainties remain, it now becomes 
possible to give a circumstantial account of the practice of rhetorical pedagogy.  
The theoretical texts of the period help us to establish a series of stages in 
rhetorical pedagogy. Beginners worked on a graded series of introductory exercises 
(progumnasmata: Webb 2001) that familiarised them with a number of techniques 
that would need to be combined in a complete speech (for example, telling a story, 
FULWLFLVLQJRUGHIHQGLQJDQDUUDWLYH¶VSODXVLELOLW\DUJXLQJDJHQHUDO WKHVLV). Students 
would then proceed to the more advanced exercise (the Latin term µGHFODPDWLRQ¶ may 
give a misleading impression of its primary point: the Greek name, PHOHWƝ, means 
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simply µH[HUFLVH¶, in which they were given a hypothetical scenario and asked to 
speak on one or other side of a judicial or deliberative dispute arising from it (Russell 
1983). To prepare them to tackle these advanced exercises, students were taught 
issue-theory, which distinguished between different kinds of dispute (the number of 
issues had now stabilised at thirteen) DQGSURYLGHGD µGLYLVLRQ¶ IRU HDFK WKDW LV, an 
ordered set of heads of argument which set a default strategy for handling each kind 
of dispute. Given a theme for declamation, the student had first to identify the issue, 
and then apply the division to the particular the case, using its circumstances to give 
concrete content to the abstract template (Heath 1995, 2007). Issue-theory was the 
PDLQ FRPSRQHQW RI µLQWHOOHFWLRQ¶ (QRƝVLV). µIQYHQWLRQ¶ (heuresis) then showed 
students how to frame the argumentative strategy of the division in the structure of a 
complete speech, providing schemes for unfolding particular lines of argument in 
detail (Heath 1997), but also, as already noted, touching on points of verbal 
expression (KHUPƝQeia). Some attention was given to fluency and flexibility in 
expression at earlier stages: beginners might be asked to repeat an exercise using a 
series of different grammatical structures; at a higher level paraphrase of existing texts 
provided a more demanding exercise. But intensive cultivation of stylistic excellence 
was reserved for the most advanced stage of the programme, which was based on the 
analysis and deployment of the components of different kinds of style (Wooten 1987).  
Theory is not autonomous. At each stage, theoretical exposition prepares the way 
for the practical exercises fundamental to the acquisition of a practical skill. What is 
learned through precept must be transformed into a habitual, internalised skill, and it 
is practice that effects this transformation. The demand for constant and intensive 
practice on the part of students of rhetoric was a commonplace: when Galen, for 
example, insists on the importance of practice in studying medicine, he turns to the 
UKHWRULF VWXGHQW¶V workload to illustrate his point (Plac. Hipp. 2.3.16, 9.2.31). The 
UKHWRULF WHDFKHU¶V ZRUNORDG FRXOG DOVR EH KHDY\ VLQFH VWXGHQWV¶ FRQVWDQW practice 
needed to be supported by individual feedback²a chore which, as noted earlier, some 
of the most eminent teachers disdained.  
Precept also, as Quintilian says, needs to be illustrated by a constant and diverse 
diet of examples (7.10.5-9). 7KHWHDFKHU¶VGHPRQVWUDWLRQVtherefore provided a further 
IRUP RI VXSSRUW IRU WKH VWXGHQW¶s practical exercises; public displays by expert 
rhetorical performers would give added variety, as would visits to the courts to 
observe professional advocates (specialists in rhetoric, not law) in action. Reading 
exemplary speeches by the classical orators was also important: though the WHDFKHU¶V
µOLYLQJ YRLFH¶ LV HVVHQWLDO VLQFH LW demonstrates speech in action with greater 
immediacy, it cannot convey everything there is to be learned from a masterpiece by 
Demosthenes (Quint. 2.2.8, 2.5.16). These would be studied in class, with the teacher 
providing a commentary that might also be the vehicle for advanced theoretical 
instruction (Heath 2004, 184-213); but private study was yet another addition to the 
UKHWRULFVWXGHQW¶Vheavy workload.  
The pattern of teaching and learning that emerged in the second century AD 
marked the culmination of a long history of experiment and innovation in rhetorical 
pedagogy. One noteworthy feature is its flexibility: it creates a plurality of exit-points. 
A student who had, for example, practised the introductory exercises and learned the 
art of division would be equipped for basic advocacy. He could analyse a case, 
pinpoint the nature of the dispute, and identify a range of relevant argumentative 
resources. Missing out on the study of invention and advanced style would not 
disadvantage him in low-level courts, where any attempt to make a lengthy speech, 
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elaborately structured and elegantly expressed, was likely to be pre-empted by the 
interventions of a magistrate with a heavy caseload and a great deal of latitude in the 
conduct of hearings. It would be primarily in more elite social strata that an advocate 
would benefit from displaying his stylistic virtuosity, his command of classical Attic 
linguistic norms, and his familiarity with the inheritance of classical culture. Since 
contemporary society had a need for trained practitioners at a variety of social and 
professional levels, the flexibility of this teaching pattern was entirely appropriate. 
Change in rhetorical theory is symptomatic of change in teaching practice; but 
changes in teaching practice were themselves sensitive to changing social demands 
for the skills pedagogy fosters. Rhetoric, as a practical discipline, must be responsive 
to its social and cultural environment. But rhetoric, in turn, contributed to the shaping 
of the larger social and cultural environment of which it was part: rhetorical teaching 
was one of the influences that created the elite culture whose expectations students of 
rhetoric had to learn to meet.  
 
Recommendations for further reading 
There is no satisfactory account of for Greek rhetorical education in the classical 
period. The task may be impossible, in view of the sparse and problematic nature of 
the evidence. But useful starting-points include Cole 1991 (on the origins of rhetoric), 
Kennedy 2007 (on early handbooks), Goebel 1989 (on arguments from probability), 
and Livingstone 1998 (on Isocrates). The evidence, for later antiquity is far more 
abundant, and in recent years has emerged from comparative neglect. Heath 2004 
quarries the technical literature; Cribiore 2007 focuses on the most successful fourth-
century teacher of Greek rhetoric, building on her excellent introduction to the 
educational context (Cribiore 2001). 
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